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Defining the Protected Class:
Who Qualifies for Protection Under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act?
[W]hat makes pregnancy a disability rather than, say, an additional ability,
is the structure of work, not reproduction.'
INTRODUCTION
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)2 amended Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964' to combat systemic workplace discrimination against
women because of their reproductive capacity. Congress drafted the PDA to
frame pregnancy discrimination broadly in pursuit of this ambitious goal,
intending to protect women "before, during, and after" pregnancy.4 The
ambiguity of the Act's text and legislative history, however, has caused
confusion in the courts, which have differed in their interpretations of the
PDA's scope. Many of these disagreements have centered on what types of
employer actions constitute "discrimination" and whether the PDA entitles a
woman to accommodation or simply protection from discrimination. This
Comment focuses instead on a prior question: who is sufficiently "affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions"' to qualify for the PDA's
protection? This preliminary decision is a crucial, yet underexplored,
component of the discussion about the PDA's scope.
1. Christine A. Littleton, Restructuring Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279, 1306 (1987).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe(k) (2ooo).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe (2ooo).
4. 124 CONG. REC. 38,573, 38,574 (1978) (statement ofRep. Sarasin).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
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Defining the PDA's protected class is particularly difficult when the
plaintiff is not pregnant at the time of the alleged discrimination. In 2007, the
Eighth Circuit became the first circuit court to address whether the PDA
applies to contraception in Union Pacific.6 That case illuminates the doctrinal
inconsistencies in judicial applications of the PDA to alleged discrimination
arising outside the nine-month window of pregnancy. The Supreme Court
made clear in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. that an employer's exclusion of all
women "capable of bearing children" from certain jobs violated Title VII.7 The
scope of the Court's decision in Johnson Controls, however, remains unclear. Far
from resolving the dispute, Union Pacific highlighted the extent of the discord
among courts with regard to contraception specifically, and "potential
pregnancy''8 more generally. The court's decision contradicts several federal
district court holdings9 and casts doubt on the PDA's coverage of women who
are not yet pregnant at the time of the alleged discrimination. Moreover, it fails
to acknowledge that the structural reality of the workplace more heavily
burdens women because of their biological differences from men.
While this Comment advocates a broad interpretation of the PDA's
protected class, it does not support an unlimited interpretation. Indeed, one
concern in extending the PDA's scope is to avoid expanding it beyond
recognition, to the point where it is no longer a useful tool. Misplacing
women's traditional social care-giving roles under the rubric of sex-specific,
biological differences also creates a danger of reinforcing the very sex
stereotypes the PDA was designed to combat. Therefore, while courts should
remove a woman's current pregnancy status from the question of whether she
is a member of the protected class, there is still a need to distinguish between
alleged discriminatory acts that implicate women's biological differences and
those that do not.
For example, an employer who fires a woman for missing work to care for
her children likely would not be liable under the PDA because the employer's
decision implicates no biological difference specific to women. Instead, it
implicates this particular woman's social role as a caregiver. By contrast, an
employer who fires a woman because of an assumption that she might take too
much time off in the future (once she becomes pregnant and has children)
would be liable under the PDA. The PDA would cover the employer's actions
because the employer's assumption rests on a belief in the connection between
6. In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2007).
7. 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991).
8. Id. at 204.
9. See infra Part III.
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a biological ability (pregnancy and childbirth) and a social act (primary
caregiving). Here, the employer assumes that a woman's reproductive capacity
will (or may) lead to a certain behavioral result (more time with her kids and
less time at work). The employer's assumption thus implicates women's
biological difference from men because it is rooted in a belief about the
connection between childbearing and childrearing.
This Comment argues that the doctrine could be clarified if courts
understood and accounted for how predominant workplace structures limit
women's professional opportunities during their childbearing years. Such an
understanding exposes the need for a broader conception of the PDA's
protected class, which would bring PDA jurisprudence in line with the original
broad aims of the Act. This Comment proposes that women be covered by the
PDA whenever an employer action threatens their workplace status because of
their reproductive capacity.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PDA
Congress's primary focus in passing the PDA was to overturn General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert,"° in which the Supreme Court held that pregnancy
discrimination was not a sex-based classification under Title VII.
Consequently, both the text and legislative history offer little guidance for
applying the PDA other than the basic premise that discrimination on the basis
of pregnancy is sex-based discrimination. Congress used expansive language
both in the statute itself and in the legislative history,12 but it left key
components of the text undefined, including the phrase "related medical
conditions."'3 Comments by lawmakers and subsequent Supreme Court
opinions indicate support for a broad interpretation of the phrase,14 but they
fail to specify precisely how broad. In addition, neither the text nor the
10. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
i. Id. at 133-36.
12. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4753 ("In using the
broad phrase 'women affected by pregnancy, childbirth and related medical conditions,' the
bill makes clear that its protection extends to the whole range of matters concerning the
childbearing process."); id. at 6-7, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N at 4754-55 ("Women are
still subject to the stereotype that all women are marginal workers.... [They are] viewed by
employers as potentially pregnant. Therefore, the elimination of discrimination based on
pregnancy in these employment practices ... will go a long way toward providing equal
employment opportunities for women.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe(k) (2000).
14. UAWv. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991); Cal. Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,
479 U.S. 272, 288-89 (1987).
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legislative history specifies what range of behavior would comprise an action
taken "because of' pregnancy. These ambiguities have led to considerable
debate over the PDA's intended or ideal reach.
Existing literature, while discussing several of the PDA's ambiguities,15 fails
to critically examine the breadth of the class protected by the PDA, despite the
prominence of this distinction in numerous judicial interpretations of the
PDA's scope. For example, in Sura v. Stearns Bank, 6 the plaintiff alleged that
tension beginning during her pregnancy about the terms of her maternity leave
culminated in a discriminatory restructuring of her job upon her return to
work. The court placed a temporal limit on the protection of the PDA, holding
that because the plaintiff had returned from maternity leave about six weeks
before the adverse employment action occurred, she no longer was a member
of the protected class. 7 Another district court, by contrast, has held that a
three-month gap between childbirth and the alleged discrimination maintains
enough of a temporal connection to pregnancy to establish the plaintiff as part
of the protected class." Without consistent criteria for who is covered under
the Act, similarly situated plaintiffs may achieve radically different results
based on each court's definition of the protected class.
The statute fails to answer the questions raised by Sura and other cases.
Neither the text nor the legislative history adequately specifies who is covered
under the Act and whether (or to what extent) there is a temporal limit to the
protection. Given this ambiguity, courts and scholars must determine how best
to construe the statute in line with its purpose. The next two Parts offer a more
coherent theory of who should be covered under the PDA. The structural
realities of the workplace mandate expanding the protected class beyond the
rigid nine-month confines of women's pregnancies. 9 Courts should apply the
PDA to all instances in which an employer's act or policy has an impact on a
iS. At issue in many PDA cases is the debate over whether the PDA mandates (or should
mandate) "equal treatment" or "special treatment," or as Christine Jolls has framed it,
antidiscrimination or accommodation. Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation,
115 HARv. L. REV. 642 (2001); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and
the Workplace: Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2157
(1994); Reva Siegel, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94
YALE L.J. 929 (1985); Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1985).
16. 90 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1176 (D. Minn. Dec. 18, 2002).
17. Id.; see also Solomen v. Redwood Advisory Co., 183 F. Supp. 2d 748 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
18. Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1487, 1493 (D. Colo. 1997).
ig. This structural perspective has been employed by other scholars to point out flaws in the
equal treatment model, but not to criticize the narrowing of the class subject to the PDA's
protection. See, e.g., Issacharoff& Rosenblum, supra note i, at 2157.
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woman's workplace status because of her reproductive capacity. This
interpretation of the PDA would better comport with Congress's broad goals
for the Act.
II. THE IMPACT OF WORKPLACE STRUCTURES
The greatest problem for many working women lies not in combating or
overcoming discrete instances of invidious discrimination, but rather in
building successful long-term careers given the structural obstacles to their
professional advancement.2" At the simplest level, these obstacles stem from
the typical workplace's restriction of space (physical location away from the
home) and time (long blocks of time at work each day, over a continuous
period of years)."1 The assumption underlying this structure is that the
employee has no significant personal obligations that might cut into his
workday or necessitate a temporary absence from the workforce. Underlying
these assumptions, then, is another assumption: someone else (e.g., a
nonworking spouse) is available to handle the employee's personal
responsibilities for him. Women who bear children automatically depart from
this default workplace model, at least temporarily.22
Even absent discriminatory animus, the expectation that women will
diverge from the default worker model leads many employers to invest
significantly less in female employees through wages, training, and
opportunities for advancement. 3 Indeed, because employers have difficulty
determining which of the women they employ will leave at some point (and for
how long), all women of childbearing age may be lumped together into the
same "flight-risk" category.' In this way, women may experience workplace
20. See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT To Do ABOUT IT (2000); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under
Law, loo YALE L.J. 1281 (1991); Siegel, supra note 15.
21. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process: Toward an Incentivized
Organizational Justice Model of Equal Employment Quality for Caregivers, 2007 UTAH L. REv.
25, 26-27; Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment
Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 5-6 (2005).
22. For empirical research on the structural obstacles in the workplace and work-life conflict, see
JERRY A. JACOBS & KATHLEEN GERSON, THE TIME DIVIDE: WORK, FAMILY, AND GENDER
INEQUALITY (2004); and Marcie Pitt-Catsouphes & Bradley K. Googins, The Paradox of
Corporate Solutions: Accomplishments, Limitations, and New Opportunities, in UNFINISHED
WORK: BUILDING EQUALITY AND DEMOCRACY IN AN ERA OF WORKING FAMILIES 224 (Jody
Heymann & Christopher Beem eds., 2005).
23. Issacharoff& Rosenblum, supra note 15, at 2166-69.
24. See, e.g., id. at 2169.
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consequences because of their reproductive capacity even if they are not
pregnant and do not intend to become pregnant. Women's physical status at
the time of the alleged discrimination is thus largely irrelevant to the question of
whether or not the alleged discrimination was on the basis ofpregnancy.2 s
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the impact of these structural
constraints to women's progress and has supported the PDA's broad goal of
eradicating these obstacles. 6 Yet all too often, lower courts have declined to
address the impact of workplace structures 7 and have consequently restricted
the size of the protected class. Without accounting for the impact of structural
obstacles on women's workplace status, courts cannot adequately construe the
PDA according to its mission.
III. THE PDA AND THE CAPACITY TO BECOME PREGNANT
In Union Pacific, female employees of a railroad brought a class action suit
arguing that the exclusion of contraceptives from the company's insurance
policy violated the PDA. They alleged that because the company offered
insurance coverage for other types of preventive care and some prescription
drugs that benefited only men-including treatment of conditions such as
male-pattern baldness-the denial of contraceptive coverage constituted
discrimination under the PDA. The district court agreed.2
8
25. For a defense of a biologically based definition of the protected class, see Herma Hill Kay,
Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 1, 22, 24,29 (1985).
26. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987) ("The entire thrust...
behind this legislation is to guarantee women the basic right to participate fully and equally
in the workforce, without denying them the fundamental right to full participation in family
life." (quoting 123 CONG. REC. 29,658 (1977) (statement of Sen. Williams))).
27. Travis, supra note 21, at 6 ('[Jludges have interpreted ... Title VII through the lens of
'workplace essentialism.' ... [They] have assumed that jobs are defined at least in part by
the default organizational structures that make up the full-time face-time norm, thereby
placing those structures beyond the reach of antidiscrimination law and undermining the
law's transformative potential.").
28. In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Neb. 2005),
rev'd, 479 F.3 d 936 (8th Cir. 2007).
1220
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The Eighth Circuit, however, reversed,29 holding that the female employees
were not a protected class under the PDA because the statute does not apply to
women with respect to contraceptive use. According to the court,
"contraception is not 'related to' pregnancy for PDA purposes and is gender-
neutral."3 This conclusion diverged from three district court opinions,3' the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) decision on the issue,32
and a prior Eighth Circuit decision that a plaintiff need not be pregnant at the
time of the alleged discrimination in order to qualify for protection under the
PDA.33 Given this array of cases, Union Pacific fails to offer a compelling and
administrable standard for determining when nonpregnant women can be
covered by the Act. By making the blanket assertion that women are not
covered by the PDA in the context of contraceptive use, the court avoids fully
addressing the specific facts of the benefit plan at issue. Rather than releasing a
decision based narrowly on the merits of Union Pacific's plan, the court
constricts the size of the PDA's protected class and precludes future plaintiffs
29. In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2007).
30. Id. at 942.
31. Stocking v. AT&T Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (W.D. Mo. 20o6), vacated on reconsideration,
2007 WL 3071825 (No. o3-o 4 21-CV) (W.D. Mo. Oct. 22, 2007) (vacating prior judgment on
account of Union Pacific); Cooley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 979, 984 (E.D.
Mo. 2003) (holding that "denying a prescription medication that allows women to control
their reproductive capacity is necessarily a sex-based exclusion" covered by the PDA);
Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1271 (W.D. Wash. 2001) ("The PDA is
not a begrudging recognition of a limited grant of rights to a strictly defined group of
women who happen to be pregnant.... [I]t is a broad acknowledgment of the intent of
Congress to outlaw any and all discrimination against any and all women .... The special
or increased healthcare needs associated with a woman's unique sex-based characteristics
must be met to the same extent, and on the same terms, as other healthcare needs."). But see
Cummins v. Illinois, No. 2002-cv-4201, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42634 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 30,
2005) (holding that an insurance policy denying contraceptive coverage does not violate the
PDA).
32. EEOC Commission Decision on Coverage of Contraception (Dec. 14, 2000), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-contraception.html ("Contraception is a means
by which a woman controls her ability to become pregnant. The PDA's prohibition on
discrimination against women based on their ability to become pregnant thus necessarily
includes a prohibition on discrimination related to a woman's use of contraceptives.").
33. Walsh v. Nat'l Computer Sys., Inc., 332 F.3 d 1150, 116o (8th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that the
plaintiff had raised a valid claim that "she was discriminated against . .. because she is a
woman who had been pregnant, had taken a maternity leave, and might become pregnant
again. 'Potential pregnancy ... is a medical condition that is sex-related because only
women can become pregnant."' (emphasis added) (quoting Kravel v. Iowa Methodist Med.
Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cit. 1996)); see also Kocak v. Cmty. Health Partners of Ohio,
Inc., 400 F.3d 466,469-70 (6th Cir. 2005).
1221
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
from raising any claim under the PDA related to contraceptive coverage. 4 The
court permits a policy that prevents women from mitigating the effects of the
typical workplace structure by planning their pregnancies (or avoiding them
altogether). The Union Pacific decision thus overlooks the structural concerns
of the workplace that necessitate a broad construal of the PDA's protected class
and instead leaves many women without recourse under the PDA when they
are outside the nine-month window of pregnancy.
Union Pacific also diverges from the Supreme Court's decision in UAW v.
Johnson Controls,3" which held that the PDA applies to discrimination on the
basis of "potential pregnancy." The Union Pacific court attempted to
distinguish Johnson Controls by reasoning that "potential pregnancy" is distinct
from "contraception," which it found to be a gender-neutral term. 6 However,
this rationale ignores the sex-specific medical effects of contraceptive use in
women.37 More importandy, it fails to account for the logistical complications
of balancing work and family that impose a disproportionate burden on
women to plan, and often postpone, their pregnancies. Women who want to
remain on the path most employers expect of their employees must plan to
continue working. Women's ability or inability to control their reproductive
capacity has a crucial impact on their advancement prospects, future earnings
potential, and job security. Access to contraceptives thus directly affects
women's ability to conform to the "ideal worker" model. As Judge Bye pointed
out in dissent, prescription contraception is the means through which "a
woman controls her potential pregnancy" and is therefore "necessarily gender-
related because it prevents pregnancy only in women.",
8
Viewed in this light, the assertion that contraception and fertility are
gender-neutral misses the point. While both men and women may be fertile or
infertile, their fertility determines the likelihood that they will cause pregnancy,
and its associated career burdens, in women. Similarly, both men and women
may use contraception, but contraception's primary purpose is to prevent
pregnancy in women. The effects of contraception are thus sex-specific, placing
34. Other scholars have examined standing doctrine more broadly and the inconsistent way that
courts have related questions of standing to the merits of a case. See, e.g., William A.
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1998).
35. UAWv.Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
36. In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936, 941-42 (8th Cir. 2007).
37. EEOC Commission Decision on Coverage of Contraception, supra note 32 (noting that
pregnancy presents significant health risks to women and that women's bodies cannot
withstand the number of pregnancies that would arise during their childbearing years if
they did not use family planning).
38. Union Pacific, 479 F.3d at 947-48 (Bye, J., dissenting).
117:1215 20o8
DEFINING THE PROTECTED CLASS
it firmly within the purview of the PDA. It is the means by which women
regulate pregnancy so that they can integrate themselves into the workplace.
This ability to integrate is a significant substantive goal of the PDA that the
Supreme Court has acknowledged and supported. 39 Moreover, it is one of the
central obstacles for women operating within a workplace structure designed
for people without personal responsibilities. Employment decisions often are
not isolated, episodic judgments, but rather are based on an employee's
longstanding record within the company and an employer's calculation of her
past (and expected future) performance. If women are to participate in the
workplace on truly equal terms, then, the protected class must be broad
enough to encompass all women who are vulnerable to adverse action because
of their reproductive capacity. While the Union Pacific holding does not, on its
own, conclusively deny PDA coverage to all nonpregnant women, the decision
rests on a faulty rationale that disregards the intricate ways in which
reproductive capacity interacts with women's professional lives.
IV. A WAY OUT?
Despite the PDA's broad aims, Union Pacific chips away at its power. It
relies on the woman's current physical state as the primary prerequisite for her
membership in the protected class, sometimes ignoring alleged discrimination
stemming largely from the employer's traditional notions of gender roles and
the inherent biases of a workplace designed for men. The PDA implicates
coverage of contraception not only because it is medically related to pregnancy,
but more importantly, because coverage that omits contraception
disadvantages women, who bear both the physical burdens and the primary
career burdens of pregnancy. Denial of contraception reinforces workplace
structures that permit men to engage fully in both their public and private
lives, but that maintain obstacles preventing women from doing the same. In
light of these structural biases, then, all women affected by employer actions
that threaten their workplace status because of their inherent biological
differences from men should be included as members of the PDA's protected
class.
In order to provide comprehensive protection for women, courts should
construe the PDA broadly to encompass all forms of discrimination on the
basis of women's childbearing capacity, regardless of the woman's pregnancy
status at the time of the discrimination. Given the workplace structure and its
impact on the progression of an employee's career, defining the protected class
39. See Cal. Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 288-89 (1987).
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of the PDA in narrow, temporal, discrete terms misconstrues the Act. Instead,
courts should employ a more flexible definition of the protected class that
accounts for the continual obstacles posed by a workplace designed for the
traditional, single breadwinner family. Courts should consider women to be
members of the PDA's protected class if employment decisions affect them on
the basis of sex-specific conditions related to procreation. This broader
definition of the protected class not only comes closer to fulfilling the PDA's
purpose, but also offers a more honest perspective on the challenges women
face when they attempt to reconcile their reproductive lives with active
workforce participation.
JILL E. HABIG
